The Quebec government introduced An Act to Protect the Province Against Communist Propaganda (Padlock Act) in 1937. The Padlock Act was inspired by an amendment to the Criminal Code that was introduced following the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919. Section 97 of the Criminal Code had empowered the federal government to deport non-citizens and charge individuals with criminal conspiracy for threatening social order or promoting revolution. Maurice Duplessis, thePremier of Quebec, introduced the Padlock Act after the federal government revoked Section 97 in 1936. The Padlock Act empowered local sheriffs (under the authority of the provincial Attorney-General) to close down meeting places suspected of promoting communism or Bolshevism (the terms were not defined in the statute). The "Padlock Act" is a reference to the practice of placing a padlock on a door to prevent use a building. Although it was possible to challenge an order in court, it was extremely difficult and, in practice, the courts were not an effective check on the powers of the Attorney General under the Padlock Act. The legislation gave the Attorney General such widespread powers that it was used to persecute Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, communists and various other suspected ‘subversives.’ The law became a rallying point for civil libertarians who considered the Act one of the most repressive pieces of legislation in Canadian history.

The legislation did not reach the Supreme Court until 1957. The only issue for the court was whether or not the legislation fell within the proper jurisdiction of the provinces, and the majority found the Padlock Act to be criminal law and, thus, ultra vires [beyond the jurisdiction] the legislature of Quebec. Ivan Rand and several other justices followed the same path previously trod by Cannon and Duff in 1937 by choosing to comment on the validity of the provincial claim to powers under ‘Property and Civil Rights’ for limiting a fundamental freedom. According to Rand, for “the past century and a half in both the United Kingdom and Canada, there has been a steady removal of restraints on this freedom [expression] stopping only at perimeters where the foundation of the freedom itself is threatened,” and freedom of expression had “a unity of interest and significance extending equally to every part of the Dominion.” Justices Fauteux and Abbot asserted their own preference to constraining the provinces’ ability to legislate against freedom of expression, with Abbot claiming that no province could violate a freedom necessary for the continued viability of Canadian democracy. The decision may not have established a precedent for protecting freedom of speech, but it was successful in eliminating one of the most draconian laws ever introduced in Canada.

Further Reading

• Ross Lambertson, Repression and Resistance: Canadian Human Rights Activists, 1930-1960 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).